Posts

As Wiley Always Said, ‘Nexus is NOT a Hair Product’

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, June 10, 2024

I used this article’s headline in a recent training class on Advanced MSPB Law: Navigating Complex Issues (next held July 9-11). It was a favorite used by FELTG Founder Bill Wiley when explaining the nexus requirement in agency cases involving discipline for employee misconduct.

An agency must establish three requirements when defending an adverse action against an employee under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75:

  • It must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct occurred as charged;
  • It must establish a nexus between that conduct and the efficiency of the service; and
  • It must demonstrate that the penalty imposed is reasonable.

5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(a), 7701(c)(1)(B); 5 C.F.R. 752.403; Pope v. USPS, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

A nexus, generally defined, is a link or connection between the misconduct and the employee’s job or the workplace; as seen under the second requirement above, the concept of nexus is often referred to as the “efficiency of the service” standard.

As we’ve discussed in a previous article, the MSPB generally recognizes three independent means by which an agency can show a nexus when the agency wants to impose discipline, particularly for off-duty misconduct:

  • A rebuttable presumption of nexus that may arise in “certain egregious circumstances” based on the nature and gravity of the misconduct (for example, cases involving harm against children);
  • The misconduct affects the employee’s or co-workers’ job performance, or management’s trust and confidence in the employee’s job performance (for example, management has lost trust in the employee’s ability to make good decisions because the employee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol); or
  • The misconduct interfered with or adversely affected the agency’s mission (for example, an employee of an agency’s morale, welfare and recreation division has an affair with an officer’s wife while the officer is deployed overseas).

A lead case on nexus for off-duty conduct, that every agency rep and union official should read, is Kruger v. DOJ, 32 M.S.P.R. 71 (Jan. 8, 1987). The case involved three Federal Bureau of Prisons employees who were reported to be smoking marijuana outside a local bar. After the agency’s investigation confirmed the events as alleged, the employees were removed on charges of “possession and use of marijuana on July 10, 1985, outside a local public tavern while off duty.” Id. at 74.

The agency justified the removal because, in part “as correctional officers, appellants have close contact with inmates and they are responsible for protecting property and inmate safety, enforcing security policies, regulations, and laws (including the laws proscribing narcotics and contraband), and assisting with inmate rehabilitation.” Id. at 74-75.

On nexus, DOJ showed that the appellants’ use of marijuana impacted agency mission because it was “antithetical to the agency’s law enforcement and rehabilitative programs that they are responsible for monitoring.” Id. The agency also showed that the notoriety of the conduct by the public “would impair the efficiency of the agency by undermining public confidence in it, thereby making it harder for the agency’s other workers to perform their jobs effectively.” Id.

The Board found the agency showed by preponderant evidence there was a nexus linking the off-duty misconduct with the efficiency of the service. It also, however, found removal was unreasonable and relied on the following Douglas factors in justifying a mitigation to a 60-day suspension:

  • None of the appellants had any prior discipline.
  • Length of service: Kruger had approximately 12 years of service and the other two appellants each had seven years.
  • The appellants all had either fully successful or outstanding performance.
  • The appellants’ truthful admissions of their misconduct on initial inquiry by the agency “indicate that they will not subsequently act in a dishonest or otherwise improper manner with the agency.” at 77.
  • The public was not aware of the events since no criminal charges were filed.

Shocking, perhaps, considering this was the 1980s and marijuana laws were quite different (and much stricter) back then. Check out the case for yourself and let us know if you have any thoughts or questions. We always enjoy getting messages from you. Hopkins@FELTG.com

 

A Supervisor’s Negative Comments About EEO = Reprisal EVERY TIME

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, June 10, 2024

It is absolutely critical for Federal supervisors and managers to understand that engaging in protected EEO activity is a right for all Federal employees, regardless of the outcome of such activity. Throughout my years in the classroom, I’ve come across numerous supervisors who believe that if an EEO complaint is found to have no merit, then the employee has not engaged in protected activity. This couldn’t be further from the truth.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for decades has held that comments which, on their face, discourage an employee from participating in the EEO complaint process can have a chilling effect on others, and as such nearly always amount to reprisal. See, e.g., Binseel v. Army, EEOC Req. No. 05970584 (Oct. 8, 1998), where the supervisor told the complainant that filing an EEO complaint was not the right approach to try to get a promotion.

Below are two more recent examples where the EEOC found reprisal because of a supervisor’s words about the EEO process:

Carlton T. v. USPS, EEOC App. No. 2019005495 (Nov. 16, 2020)

EEOC found a supervisor’s criticism of the manner in which the complainant filed EEO complaints constituted reprisal. Examples of the supervisor’s criticism included:

  • Telling the complainant he [the supervisor] thought it was “pretty sad” the complainant made up stories about people, and that this was why the complainant’s EEO complaints “never went anywhere, as nobody believed” him. at 9.
  • Telling the complainant, “you think you’re a specialist[,] but they reject all your [EEO complaints] because they’re all misspelled and have a lot of run-on sentences.”
  • In response to the complainant’s offer to assist a coworker in filing an EEO complaint, the supervisor told the complainant, “[t]he one who [is] stupid is you because you were pushing him [Complainant’s coworker] to file an EEO [complaint] against [S2][;] just because you can’t beat him you want somebody else to join in.”
  • Characterizing the complainant’s actions as “pathetic.”

Bert P. v. Army, EEOC App. No. 2020003846 (Nov. 15, 2021)

During the pre-complaint (informal) EEO process, a supervisor told the EEO Counselor “ … employees should have to pay to file an EEO complaint and only get it back if and when they may prevail.” Id. at 7.

The complainant originally saw a copy of the EEO Counselor’s draft report containing the comment. However, the comment was removed from the final report. The complainant testified that after seeing the supervisor’s comment in the draft report, the complainant thought the supervisor believed EEO “complaints are frivolous and [employees] ought to pay a fee so it would deter people from making complaints.” Id.

According to the case, the EEO Counselor removed the comment from the final report after being directed to do so by the EEO Manager. In its Final Agency Decision (FAD) the agency found that this comment amounted to per se retaliation because of its potential chilling effect on future would-be filers. The Commission agreed.

If you’re a supervisor or manager, it’s important to understand your role in the process from the very beginning. That’s why FELTG is offering a brand-new class on June 27 called The Supervisor’s Role in the EEO Counseling and Investigative Processes. In just two hours, we’ll cover everything from how to behave after an employee has claimed discrimination, to how to respond to an investigator’s written interrogatories. Plus, you can ask your questions and get answers in real time. You cannot afford to miss this event. hopkins@feltg.com

Related training

Indefinite Suspensions: When Medical Conditions Create Concerns

,

An indefinite suspension occurs when an agency puts an employee in a temporary status without duties and without pay for an undetermined period of time. Learn more.

Read more

A MAJOR New Requirement in Excessive Absence Cases

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, May 13, 2024

We haven’t had many precedential MSPB cases this year, but the eighth one was BIG, involving a new requirement for removals under a charge of excessive absence. Excessive absence removals can be a little weedy, but if you ever handle these kinds of cases for your agency, please take five minutes to read on, or save this article and come back when you have time.

A general principle is the agency cannot take an adverse action against an employee for absences it has approved. It wouldn’t make sense (or be fair) for an employee to be disciplined for a situation where the supervisor had granted discretionary leave, or the employee had an entitlement to the leave (such as sick leave).

However, sometimes approved leave can extend so long that it causes an issue for the agency – most often in situations of extended Leave without Pay (LWOP), and sometimes including copious amounts of sick leave and/or annual leave. In rare circumstances, an agency may remove an employee for excessive absences, even if the employee has been on approved leave, but to justify doing so, the agency must prove the following elements:

  1. The employee was absent for compelling reasons beyond his control;
  2. The absences continued beyond a reasonable time, and the agency warned the employee that an adverse action would be taken unless the employee became available for duty on a regular basis; and
  3. The position needed to be filled by an employee available for duty on a regular basis.

Cook v. Army, 18 M.S.P.R. 610 (1984).

In the precedential case that brings us together today, the Board added a significant amendment to how an agency determines what absences can be tabulated to meet the “beyond a reasonable time” standard:

We hold that, to prove a charge of excessive approved absences, an agency cannot rely on absences that predate the warning… It would be a stretch to consider a notification of potential discipline as a “warning” to the extent that the notice was given after the underlying conduct already occurred.

Williams v. Commerce, 2024 MSPB 8, ¶6-7 (Apr. 23, 2024).

Up until Williams, agencies would typically send the warning letter after hundreds, if not thousands, of hours of absences and then remove the employee fairly shortly after the warning was issued if the employee did not return to work or still had significant absences after he returned to work.

Does Williams mean the agency cannot rely on any of the absences leading up to the warning to return? Not exactly. The Board said, “Prewarning absences may still be relevant for other purposes, such as evaluating medical evidence or determining whether the absences have a foreseeable end. However, they cannot be used to support the charge itself. Rather, a charge of excessive absences will only be sustained when the post-warning absences were themselves excessive.” Id. at ¶8.

In Williams, the absences still amounted to 1,109.25 hours in the one-year period after the agency warned the appellant to come back to work, so the Board held the agency proved its case even after discounting the prewarning absences.

This case raises the question, of course, about what the Board will consider to be “excessive” post-warning. Does existing Board case law still stand, given that until now the pre-warning absences could be counted, or will a new line of cases give us updated parameters?

Fortunately, the Board has indicated at least some past precedent is still good law. In Williams, it cited Gartner v. Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 463, ¶ 10-11 (2007), a case where the agency proved an excessive absence charge when an employee was absent 333.5 hours during a 6-month period (about a third of the time). So, we may not be looking at additional multiple years beyond the warning letter, but we can guess it likely requires several absences over the course of a few months, at a minimum.

We are going to hash this out, along with any other new cases on excessive absence, during next month’s Absence, Leave Abuse & Medical Issues Week, June 2-6, 2025. Hope you can make the time to join us! hopkins@feltg.com

P.S. You can read the full Williams opinion here.

Indefinite Suspensions: When Employees Engage in Criminal Conduct

,

In the first of a series of three articles focusing on indefinite suspensions, we’re looking at indefinite suspension because the agency has reasonable cause to believe the employee has committed a crime that could result in imprisonment. Learn more.

Read more

‘Mere Flirtation’ with 16-Year-Old is NOT a Defense to Sexual Misconduct

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, April 15, 2024

Buried in the trove of MSPB’s case inventory are hundreds of cases involving discipline of Federal employees. Maybe it’s because the Board members are working through an unprecedented backlog and are issuing cases at a dizzying pace but, regardless of the reason, I’ve noticed some highly disturbing conduct in recent cases.

The good news is the agencies employing these individuals are almost always taking the conduct seriously. Most have removed offending employees for egregious misconduct. Below are summaries of three cases dealing with removable sexual misconduct in the workplace.

The English Professor Whose Discussion Went Beyond Literature

Fleming v. Navy, PH-0752-18-0457-I-1 (Jan. 26, 2024)(NP)

The appellant was a tenured professor at the U.S. Naval Academy who taught a Rhetoric & Introduction to Literature class. The agency removed him for Conduct Unbecoming a Federal Employee with seven specifications because he:

  • Referred to students as “right-wing extremists.”
  • Made comments about and discussed anal sex, oral sex, and transgender surgery.
  • Emailed partially clothed photos of himself to students after having been counseled that doing so was inappropriate and agreeing to refrain from doing so.
  • Touched students without their approval.
  • Referred to his own sexual experiences.
  • Repeatedly mispronounced an Asian-American student’s name despite being corrected several times.
  • Made demeaning, sexually related comments about a child and her mother because of how they were dressed.

Id. at 2-3.

The administrative judge (AJ) overturned the removal, (surprisingly) finding the agency did not prove any of the specifications, but the Board disagreed and reinstated the removal because all seven specifications of the conduct were unprofessional, and the deciding official’s penalty was within the bounds of reasonableness.

The FBI Agent Who Harassed Young Women

Ybarra v. DOJ, CH-0752-17-0422-I-2 (Mar. 21, 2024)

The appellant, a GS-13 special agent at the FBI, specialized in working cases involving crimes against children. The agency removed him for professional off-duty conduct after learning he made “persistent and inappropriate advances toward two female employees at two different stores … both of whom had separately complained to the local police about the appellant’s conduct.” Id. at ¶2. One of the employees was only 16 years old.

Although the conduct was off-duty, the AJ found the agency “established nexus because the appellant’s misconduct contravenes the agency’s primary mission to protect people…. [and] the appellant was specifically tasked with enforcing Federal statutes to protect children under the age of 18.” Id. at ¶8. She also found nexus because the conduct adversely affected his supervisors’ trust and confidence, as well as that of local law enforcement. The appellant argued his conduct did not establish nexus because it was “mere flirtation,” Id. at ¶9, but the AJ and the Board disagreed.

The Board upheld the removal, finding the penalty reasonable especially because only three months before the events in this case, local police warned the appellant about bothering a young cashier at a grocery store. In addition, the appellant had a previous 45-day suspension for making sexually inappropriate remarks to female colleagues. While the suspension had occurred 14 years earlier, it was still an aggravating factor given the similarity in the conduct.

The agency’s investigation revealed the appellant had engaged in additional misconduct, but it declined to charge him for the below instances, listed in ¶2:

  • Failure to report police contact related to the two store employees,
  • Lack of candor in the same incidents involving the two store employees,
  • Making several unwanted sexual advances toward colleagues,
  • Engaging in a profane outburst during firearms training,
  • His role in a domestic disturbance between his son’s mother and a female neighbor with whom he was having a relationship, and
  • Unauthorized use of an FBI database to obtain the telephone number of a former female investigation subject.

The Board held that while the agency “took an unusual approach to its disciplinary action … assessing each charge in isolation and proposing the appellant’s removal based solely on what it considered to be the most serious one,” the removal for the charged misconduct alone was still warranted. Id. at ¶15.

The Supervisor Who Had an Affair with a Married Subordinate

Riley v. USPS, DC-0752-16-0465-I-1 (Feb. 20, 2024)(NP)

The appellant, a postmaster, was removed for Improper Conduct after he admitted to having a sexual relationship with a subordinate, who was married at the time of the affair. His proposed removal notice also indicated he sent inappropriate text messages to, inappropriately touched, and/or pursued a sexual relationship with other female subordinates.

The appellant argued that the relationship with his married subordinate was consensual and personal and did not constitute improper conduct, because it did not result in favoritism or an unsafe work environment. The agency countered that favoritism was not an essential part of the charge and that the conduct was improper regardless of whether it was consensual, because of the appearance of impropriety or favoritism to other employees who learned of the affair.

Regarding his conduct with other employees, which included attempting to have sexual relationships with them, the Board also found improper:

  • A text message the appellant sent to a subordinate, telling her that she was his favorite and that he would be on her “like a cheetah on a gazelle.” at 6.
  • The appellant put his hand up a different subordinate’s shirt and unhooked her bra. at 7.

Agencies have long taken actions involving sexual misconduct seriously, and it’s a good thing because this type of conduct is one of the most effective ways to make a workplace unsafe and drive away good employees. The Board clearly sees things the same way. hopkins@feltg.com

Changing an Existing Accommodation is STILL a Terrible Idea

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, April 15, 2024

In this newsletter, we’ve talked about the “coming and going rule” and an agency’s responsibility in the workers’ comp arena. In previous newsletters, we’ve discussed the dangers of altering an existing accommodation.

On a related note, what happens when an agency changes an accommodation it provided to assist an employee with ambulatory issues accessing (coming to and going from) her workspace? Consider Malorie D. v. DOJ/DEA, App. No. 2019003000 (Sept. 15, 2020).

The complainant worked as GS-7 intelligence program support assistant. She requested a reasonable accommodation of a parking space that was close to the building and to the door nearest her workstation. She specifically asked to be assigned the only parking spot reserved for individuals with disabilities in her building’s west (supervisor’s) parking lot, because the parking area was on a flat surface and the closest lot to her office. The agency approved her request.

Thereafter, two other employees who had parking placards because of disabilities also requested reserved parking. The agency initially reserved two parking spaces in the south parking lot for these individuals. Just a few days later, agency management sent an email to all employees in the office that any individual “requesting reserved parking was required to use designated spots in the east parking lot; [and] that entry to the building would be through the secured entry point…” which was also known as the “front door.” Id. at 2.

The complainant informed the agency the change in her accommodation “was problematic because the handicap spaces in the east parking lot were farther from her office than the space in the west parking lot and that the front door was often not attended to by duty personnel, forcing her to walk a long distance to the north entrance of the building.” Id. In addition, the east parking lot was not flat. It had curbs and ramps that caused her to trip and fall.

During the precomplaint process, the agency supervisor who revoked the complainant’s existing accommodation informed the EEO counselor he was no longer able to provide the complainant with her original parking spot because he could not “be put in a position to decide which employee is more handicapped than another. Because of the problems associated with this particular handicap spot in the Supervisors [west] parking area, the handicap designation is being removed from the spot.” Id. at 3. The agency designated the complainant’s previous parking spot as reserved for the employee of the month.

The complainant filed a formal EEO complaint. After initially requesting a hearing, she withdrew the request. The agency issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD). The agency determined that after revoking the complainant’s parking spot in the west, it still provided her with a reasonable accommodation when it offered her designated parking in the east lot because the east lot was only “slightly further away from Complainant’s office than her previously assigned parking space in the west parking lot.” Id. at 4. In addition, because the complainant was only unable to access the building via the front door just five times in six months, “the infrequent lack of immediate access does not render the accommodation in the east parking lot unreasonable.” Id.

On appeal, the EEOC disagreed with the FAD. They found the agency failed to “engage in the interactive process prior to removing the accommodation it had provided her for nearly four years.” Id. at 7.

We’ve said it before and we’ll say it again: If an accommodation is working, the agency should not revoke it without, at a minimum, engaging in the interactive process to see if another effective accommodation is available.  And because the agency did not do so, EEOC remanded the case for a compensatory damages assessment.

This summer we’re bringing back our always-popular Reasonable Accommodation series, with six 60-minute sessions, each targeted to a particular accommodation challenge. Or, bring an Agency Direct Reasonable Accommodation training to your workplace. Hopkins@FELTG.com

When an Employee Pulls Out a Knife During a PIP Meeting…

,

There is delicacy and strategy required when charging an appellant with misconduct that requires proof of intent. A recent case shows us how problematic this 6-letter word (i-n-t-e-n-t) can be when it’s put, or even implied, in the wrong place. Read more.

Read more

Luck of the Irish? Not in These Findings of No Discrimination

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, March 11, 2024

Just about every week, FELTG instructors talk to supervisors who are concerned about, and even afraid of, EEO complaints being filed against them. We tell them that while the fear is real, the majority of EEO complaints result in a finding of no discrimination. The fear of a complaint should not stop a supervisor from doing her job.

As part of our EEOC Law Week training (which next begins March 24, 2025), we discuss intentional discrimination claims and the types of events – sometimes referred to as discrete acts – that could form the basis of a claim. This may include:

  • Discipline or proposed discipline
  • Changes to duties
  • Denial of leave requests
  • Selections
  • Promotions
  • Reassignments
  • Details
  • Workload changes
  • Performance ratings
  • Denials of telework, training, or other work privileges

This is not an exhaustive list, and sometimes complainants file based on actions outside of this scope. As I recently conducted a search for cases involving facts around St. Patrick’s Day, I came across a case involving an intentional discrimination claim: Brady v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01A55711 (Feb. 14, 2006).

The complainant, a distribution window clerk in Key West, FL, requested to be allowed to wear an Irish scally cap at work on St. Patrick’s Day. His supervisor denied the request (after all, USPS employees have a uniform code), so the complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging discrimination based on his national origin (Irish).

The agency filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the complainant was not aggrieved and failed to state a claim under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1).  The administrative judge (AJ) agreed with the agency, explaining that the complainant did not suffer any harm when he was not permitted to wear a scally cap in the workplace.

The complainant appealed the dismissal to the EEOC, and according to the case:

The Commission’s federal sector case precedent has long defined an “aggrieved employee” as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049, 1994 EEOPUB LEXIS 3552 (April 21, 1994).

The Commission finds that complainant failed to show how the alleged incident resulted in a harm or … loss regarding a term, condition or privilege of his employment. The alleged event does not render complainant an “aggrieved” employee. Accordingly, the agency’s final decision implementing the AJ’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim is AFFIRMED.

Id. at 3-4.

Here are a couple of other cases involving St. Patrick’s Day facts:

  • The complainant alleged discrimination based on race and reprisal when the agency denied his request for admin leave to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade when coworkers were granted two hours of admin leave to march in a Black History Month parade. Stevens v. USPS, EEOC App. No. 01892854 (Aug. 1, 1989)
  • The complainant, a probationer, alleged discrimination based on national origin (Irish-American) when he was terminated on St. Patrick’s Day. Fanning v. Treasury, EEOC App. No. 01943136 (June 20, 1995).

Many will file, and few will prevail. That’s not to detract from the reality that discrimination occurs, and it can ruin the lives of its victims. But in most cases, allegations remain merely that – allegations with no finding of discrimination. hopkins@feltg.com

Agency Clarifies a Vague Standard During PIP

, ,

By Deborah J. Hopkins, March 11, 2024

We get a lot of questions about how a supervisor can effectively address unacceptable performance when an employee’s performance standards are written in a vague or subjective manner. In fact, vague standards are probably one of the top reasons why supervisors don’t address performance issues with employees more often.

The good news, which we share in all of our performance classes, is that a vaguely written standard in itself does not preclude an agency from addressing unacceptable performance in real time.

Let’s look at a recent MSPB case involving a travel office financial management specialist at NASA, Atkinson v. NASA, AT-0432-20-0510-I-1 (Feb. 7, 2024)(NP). The appellant’s primary duty was to monitor the Travel Request Mailbox (TRM), which was an electronic mailbox that received requests for travel authorizations and travel expense reimbursements. The agency had provided the appellant with Travel Request Mailbox Instructions (TRMI), which was “a detailed set of instructions for monitoring the TRM, and included classifying emails in the TRM inbox, forwarding emails to designated personnel, and documenting the status of travel-related requests.” Id. at 2.

The appellant’s performance plan included a critical element titled “Process Civil Service Travel” (critical element 2) and her performance standard required her to, among other things, “produce accurate work with ‘no significant errors.”’ Id. at 3. Below is a summary of the events in the case:

  • In October 2016, the supervisor informed the appellant she was not meeting expectations in critical element 2 due to the significant number of errors she was making in monitoring the TRM.
  • In May 2017, after deeming the appellant’s performance unacceptable for [critical] element 2 in her first performance appraisal, the supervisor placed the appellant on a 60-day performance improvement plan (PIP). The PIP informed the appellant that she was required to demonstrate acceptable performance in critical element 2 by the end of the PIP period by, among other things, “correctly address[ing] all emails in the [TRM] according to the TRMI.”
  • The agency provided the appellant, who was deaf, with a video ASL translation of the TRMI before the PIP and full-time assistance of interpreters prior to and throughout the PIP. The appellant’s supervisor and the travel office lead met with the appellant regularly during the PIP to discuss her performance, including her continuing errors.

Id.

At the conclusion of the PIP, the appellant was still not performing at an acceptable level. The proposed removal identified over 180 errors she made during the PIP. The deciding official upheld the removal. The appellant filed an appeal to MSPB, challenging the removal in part by claiming that her performance standards were invalid – a claim that, if proven, would render the removal inappropriate.

The appellant argued the requirement that her work contain “no significant errors” was overly subjective, and what constituted a “significant” error was never defined. Id. at 5. The Board disagreed, relying on the hearing testimony from both the travel office lead and the appellant’s supervisor, who said that “significant errors” are “those which impacted the processing of travel-related requests,” and they shared multiple examples of these types of errors with the appellant. Id. In addition, the appellant received detailed feedback about her performance deficiencies before and during the PIP, so the word “significant” was given appropriate context and was not overly vague or subjective.

If performance standards are written vaguely or subjectively, the agency may clarify the expectations by fleshing out the standard or giving examples of performance, during the PIP itself. To learn how to do this, join us for MSPB Law Week, April 15-19. Hopkins@FELTG.com